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 Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human 
Rights: A Reply 
 Paolo G.  Carozza *  
 COLUMBINE: Pierrot, you work too hard. 
 You need a rest. Come on out into the garden, 
 And sing me something sad. 
 PIERROT: Don’t stand so near me! 
 I am become a socialist. I love 
 Humanity; but I hate people. 1 
 Human dignity and human rights are not lived as abstract concepts. They have tan-
gible meaning and weight in the context and crucible of concrete human experience  – 
history, freedom, reason, and community. This gap between universal and particular 
is the heart of the problem with which Christopher McCrudden’s  ‘ Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights  ’  2 wrestles, as well as the fulcrum of the earlier 
article of mine to which, in part, his work responds. 3 
 The diffi culty is of course not unique to the concept of human dignity. It is common 
to all of the large and general principles involved in the interpretation and adjudica-
tion of human rights: for instance, foundational aspirations like equality, justice, and 
peace; 4 criteria of limitation such as the necessities of  ‘ a democratic society ’ ; 5 judicial 
tests of reasonableness or proportionality; 6 structural principles like subsidiarity 7 or 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; President, Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights; Visiting Associate Professor of Law and John Harvey Gregory Lecturer on World Organization, 
Harvard Law School, Spring 2009. For sharing helpful discussions and comments I am grateful to 
A.J. Bellia, John Finnis, Mary Ann Glendon, Stefania Ninatti, Patti Ogden, Andrea Simoncini, Carter 
Snead, and Mykola Sorochinsky. 
 1  St Vincent Millay,  ‘ Aria da Capo ’ , in  Selected Poems (ed. J.D. McClatchy, 2003), at 75. 
 2  19  EJIL (2008) 655. 
 3  Carozza,  ‘ “ My Friend is a Stranger ” : The Death Penalty and the Global  Ius Commune of Human Rights ’ , 
81  Texas L Rev (2003) 1031. 
 4  See, e.g., Preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
 5  See, e.g., Articles 8 – 11 ECHR. 
 6  See Y. Arai-Takahashi,  The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Juris-
prudence of the ECHR (2002). 
 7  See Carozza,  ‘ Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law ’ , 97  AJIL 
(2003) 38. 
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the common good. 8 All these concepts have a multiplicity of possible valences and 
implications which can diverge signifi cantly in context, 9 and their underdetermined 
meanings make them susceptible to the risks of substantial manipulation. Still, the 
concept of dignity does have a pre-eminent place in the collection of ideas and prin-
ciples applicable in the fi eld of human rights. As McCrudden shows exhaustively, the 
idea of human dignity serves as the single most widely recognized and invoked basis 
for grounding the idea of human rights generally, 10 and simultaneously as an excep-
tionally widespread tool in judicial discourse about the content and scope of specifi c 
rights. 
 1   The  Ius Commune of Human Rights at Work 
 Moreover, as McCrudden acknowledges, his survey also confi rms one of the main 
parts of the thesis (mine and others ’ ) of an emerging global  ius commune of human 
rights: that the concept of human dignity, in virtue of its purchase on universality, 
serves as a common currency of transnational judicial dialogue and borrowing in 
matters of human rights. 11 That is, however, only one element of the modern, global 
 ius commune of human rights, and unless seen in relationship to the other aspects of 
the  ius commune can easily be misunderstood or overstated. 
 On the one hand, careful reading and comparative analysis of a broad range of judi-
cial discourse on a core human rights norm like the right to life in capital punishment 
cases shows quite clearly that the concept of human dignity serves several purposes. 
First, it provides one of the principal justifi cations for courts to take foreign sources of 
law into account in their decision-making, independently of the constraints of positive 
law. Human dignity in this way serves as the basis for the  ‘ suprapositivity ’ of borrowed 
principles of human rights which Gerald Neuman has identifi ed and described. 12 By 
 8  See Carozza,  ‘ The Universal Common Good and the Authority of International Law ’ , 8  Logos: A Journal Of 
Catholic Thought And Culture (2006) 28. 
 9  Much of the problem which McCrudden grapples with, in fact, can be understood as arising merely out of 
the fact that fundamental rights operate as principles, not rules, a distinction which Dworkin elaborated 
decades ago: R. Dworkin,  Taking Rights Seriously (1978), at 23 – 28, 71 – 80. Robert Alexy has explained 
more recently and more thoroughly many of the implications of understanding fundamental rights as 
principles, including the need for optimization: see generally R. Alexy,  A Theory of Constitutional Rights 
(2002). 
 10  One additional important example to add to the many cited by McCrudden is the Universal Declaration 
of Bioethics and Human Rights, which provides that  ‘ [n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted 
as implying for any State, group or person any claim to engage in any activity or to perform any act 
contrary to human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity ’ . In drafting that instrument the 
UNESCO Secretariat began the process by sending out a questionnaire asking participating states, among 
other things, which principles were most important to include in the draft declaration.  ‘ Human dignity ’ 
was the only one to get 100% support: Snead,  ‘ Assessing the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Hu-
man Rights ’ , 7  National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly (2007) 53, at 57 – 58. 
 11  Carozza,  supra note 3. The general conclusions about judicial discourse which are summarized in the 
following few paragraphs are drawn from the more detailed collection and analysis of judicial decisions 
in that article. 
 12  Neuman,  ‘ Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance ’ , 55  Stanford L Rev 
(2003) 1863. 
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appealing to the principle of human dignity, courts establish the basic ground of com-
monality and comparability of their decisions with those of courts in other jurisdic-
tions, despite whatever other differences may exist in their positive law or political 
and historical context. It indirectly  ‘ licenses ’ , in other words, comparative exercises 
in constitutional adjudication. 13 Conversely, when judges make decisions in this area 
diverging from the decisions of other courts, they often take care to explain why their 
jurisdiction has particular requirements (of positive law or social necessity, for exam-
ple) which justify a different outcome in spite of the commonality of human dignity at 
stake. In both cases, therefore, they reveal a working hypothesis that human dignity 
 justifi es reliance on foreign norms and requires a particular  justifi cation for departing 
from foreign models in judicial decision-making. Reliance on the idea of human dig-
nity as a source of justifi cation in this way simply does not make sense unless it is 
regarded, at least implicitly, as something the meaning and value of which transcend 
local context and constitute a commonality across the differences of time and place. 
One could not, for example, justify judicial borrowing by reference to a concept that 
did not carry normative weight in one’s own epistemic framework  – say, importing 
Islamic understandings of gender relations into United States law by reference to the 
justifi catory value of the  shari’a . 
 On the other hand, the global  ius commune of human rights is very far from merely 
an expression of the universality of human dignity. Crucially, it has what I have pre-
viously described as a  ‘ symbiotic ’ relationship with the  ius proprium of different juris-
dictions. 14 The universal value of human dignity remains in a complex and concrete 
relationship with the particular positive law of any given, specifi c legal context, such 
that  ‘ it remains informal, fl exible and pluralistic in its relationship to local law and 
culture ’ . 15 It is not suffi cient, therefore, to regard the use of human dignity in human 
rights adjudication just as an exercise in the  ‘ universalistic naturalism ’ that McCrud-
den describes and then rightly rejects as utopian optimism. Rather, it is a process of 
specifi cation, of  determinatio in the language of the classical natural law tradition  – 
using human reason and freedom to give specifi c practical expression to more general 
abstract principles. 16 Crucially, this means that the instantiation can be realized in 
a variety of different ways, each different from one another but each fully consist-
ent with the general principle. That is the  ‘ working out of the practical implications 
of human dignity in varying concrete contexts ’ 17 to which I refer in my descriptive 
analysis of global jurisprudence in human rights, and which in McCrudden’s synthe-
sis could be misread to indicate only a process of broadening and deepening a uniform 
understanding of a universal norm. 
 13  See Tushnet,  ‘ The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law ’ , 108  Yale LJ (1999) 1225, at 1231 –
 1239 (arguing that comparative analyses constitute cogent legal arguments only when they address 
constitutional provisions for which the court has  ‘ licensed ’ a policy accepting comparative arguments). 
 14  Carozza,  supra note 3, at 1082 – 1084. 
 15  Ibid ., at 1043. 
 16  On the meaning and workings of  determinatio see J. Finnis,  Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980), at 
281 – 290; George,  ‘ Natural Law and International Order ’ , in D. Mapel and T. Nardin (eds),  International 
Society (1998), at 54, 62 – 64. 
 17  Carozza,  supra note 3, at 1082. 
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 In sum,  ‘ the idea of a new  ius commune is a metaphor for a complex of human rights 
norms and legal relationships that combine unity and universality with pluralism 
and differentiation ’ . 18 For this reason, it most defi nitely does not represent a pro-
cess of  ‘ identifying the  “ best ” approach with the ultimate aim of securing its univer-
sal adoption ’ . 19 Instead, it is best understood as embodying the value of subsidiarity, 
with its attendant pluralism, rather than uniformity  – this, I argued, is precisely one 
of the virtues of a  ius commune approach to global human rights norms. 20 McCrud-
den certainly seems to agree, noting the parallel between what he perceives to be the 
functioning of human dignity in adjudication and the functioning of the principle of 
subsidiarity; both, in his estimation,  ‘ mediate the polarity of pluralism and the com-
mon good in a globalized world ’ . 21 
 From this perspective, McCrudden’s analysis largely seems to confi rm, in helpful 
detail, the descriptive accuracy of the  ius commune thesis. He concedes that the univer-
salism of the concept of human dignity is employed by judges to legitimate and license 
transnational jurisprudential openness. At the same time he shows that in practice, 
at least in certain important categories of issues and cases, the specifi cation of the 
abstract universal principle in concrete legal contexts results in diverse instantiations 
of the concept of human dignity. His study of law-in-action, beyond the formalities of 
law on the books or mere judicial discourse, is an excellent example of a good com-
parative legal scholar’s appreciation of functional analysis and its fruits. 
 2 From the Core to the Margins of Human Dignity 
 Beyond those broad similarities of argument, there are nevertheless smaller yet 
im portant differences of emphasis between our respective attempts to describe and 
interpret the data regarding the use of human dignity in the judicial interpretation of 
human rights. In particular, McCrudden makes two interdependent points regarding 
(a)  ‘ a minimum core of the meaning of human dignity ’ and (b) the absence of mean-
ingful similarities among the  ‘ several different conceptions of human dignity ’ present 
in judicial discourse beyond the minimum core. 
 First, he identifies the core of the idea of human dignity as containing three 
im portant ideas: an ontological claim about the intrinsic worth of the human person; a 
relational claim about how others should treat human persons in view of their inher-
ent value; and a claim regarding the proper role of the state  vis-à-vis the individual 
(i.e., that the state exists for the good of persons and not vice-versa). It is worth noting, 
fi rst, that there are in fact two different but interrelated concepts at work in this idea 
of human dignity as McCrudden describes it: (a) the ontological claim that all human 
beings equally have this status, this equal moral worth; and (b) combining the sec-
ond and third elements of McCrudden’s description, the normative principle that all 
 18  Ibid ., at 1043. 
 19  Contrary to what McCrudden claims to be the aim of my comparative analysis. McCrudden,  supra note 2, 
at 696. 
 20  Carozza,  supra note 3, at 1085. See more generally Carozza,  supra note 7. 
 21  McCrudden,  supra note 2, at 719, quoting Carozza,  supra note 7, at 38. 
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human beings are entitled to have this status of equal moral worth respected by oth-
ers and therefore also have a duty to respect it in all others. One might more precisely 
refer, therefore, to the  ‘ status and basic principle ’ of human dignity. 22 
 McCrudden at fi rst acknowledges that this status and basic principle of human dig-
nity are not merely fatuous or insignifi cant. Even stated at very high levels of gen-
erality and incompleteness, they have served to catalyse political action for human 
rights and their recognition in positive law. They are widely accepted and employed 
by judges in interpreting that law. And they are suffi ciently robust in substance to 
challenge and undermine the legitimacy of a wide array of political and economic sys-
tems which at different times have wielded power in ways systematically contrary to 
the good of human persons. Nevertheless, despite this potency McCrudden thereafter 
seems relatively dismissive of the value of the minimum core content of the status and 
principle of dignity, referring to it as an  ‘ empty shell ’ . 23 
 McCrudden sustains the empty-core thesis here by going on to describe the wide 
differences in the practical application of the idea of human dignity in various jurisdic-
tions:  ‘ when the concept comes to be applied the appearance of commonality disap-
pears, and human dignity (and with it human rights) is exposed as culturally relative, 
deeply contingent on local politics and values, resulting in signifi cantly diverging, 
even confl icting, conceptions ’ . 24 The array of examples he then assembles in support 
of this assertion is drawn from courts in North America, Europe, and South Africa, 
and relates to a range of highly contested issues in the adjudication of rights, such as 
abortion, euthanasia, the distribution of economic and social benefi ts, hate speech, 
and pornography. These do without doubt reveal highly variable, and at times mutu-
ally incompatible, uses of the language and concepts of human dignity by the different 
courts surveyed. 
 Surrounding this reduced appreciation of the minimum core of the status and basic 
principle of human dignity with the evidence of signifi cant disagreement, McCrudden 
then proposes at least two possible conclusions, one more ambitious and the other rel-
atively modest. The larger claim is that the gap between minimum core content and 
wide divergence at the margins exposes judicial dignity-talk as fundamentally a sham. 
The earlier  ‘ recognition of the fundamental worth of the human person as a funda-
mental principle to which the positive law should be accountable ’ is just  ‘ apparent ’ . 
The appeal to dignity in fact  ‘ seems to camoufl age ’ manipulability and indeterminacy 
with a superfi cially legitimizing (but in fact false and parasitic) claim of universality. 25 
Acknowledging that his limited set of samples may not be suffi cient to sustain that 
stronger claim, McCrudden then offers also the more restrained one: that  ‘ in the judi-
cial interpretation of human rights there is no common substantive conception of dig-
nity, although there appears to be an acceptance of the concept of dignity ’ . A corollary 
 22  I am indebted to John Finnis for helping me to clarify and articulate this point. 
 23  McCrudden,  supra note 2, at 698. 
 24  Ibid . 
 25  Ibid ., at 710. Of course, as implied in the introductory paragraphs, this danger is no less present with 
respect to a number of other key normative concepts in human rights, such as  ‘ equality ’ or  ‘ autonomy ’  – 
and indeed it is true of the idea of  ‘ human rights ’ itself. 
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of his more modest conclusion is that  ‘ the concept of human dignity has contributed 
little to developing a consensus on the implications of any of the three basic elements 
of the minimum core ’ . In other words, judicial use of  ‘ dignity ’ is not dishonest, per-
haps, but it is not particularly helpful either (at least insofar as we do or should seek 
common understandings of the status and basic principle of human dignity). 
 McCrudden’s more limited conclusion seems correct, and even his stronger one is 
suffi ciently warranted to be taken quite seriously, provided that both are understood 
with some important qualifi cations. To begin with, I believe that McCrudden is a little 
too quick to declare the minimum core unhelpfully vacuous. As he himself pointed 
out earlier, relying on Neuman, even the claims contained in the most broad and gen-
eral statement of the status and basic principle of human dignity have some important 
traction, and are suffi cient to exclude from reasonable consideration many political 
and social systems that, for instance, engage in gross and systematic violations of the 
life, liberty, integrity, and equality of their people. In the context of legal systems, the 
general level of strength and maturity of which have taken human rights debates 
beyond such uncontestable violations of human dignity, this minimum core may not 
seem terribly useful or signifi cant. But for many, perhaps most, countries of the world 
the problems of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, systematic discrimination, 
disappearances, torture, or unspeakably inhuman prison conditions  – to name just 
a few of the issues that are extremely close to the inviolable core of human dignity  – 
are much more vital to people’s daily struggles and concerns than are (for instance) 
the legal and ethical dilemmas surrounding the end of life which are made possible 
only where highly sophisticated and expensive advanced medical care is available. 
Moreover, even in those countries or regions where such basic violations of human 
rights would seem to be a thing left behind in some dark past, we should be sober 
about the possibility for evil inherent in the human heart to be made manifest again. 
The grim United States experience with torture and degrading treatment in recent 
years, 26 and the Council of Europe’s current need to grapple with wholesale violations 
of life and physical integrity within its ranks for the fi rst time in its history, 27 should be 
suffi cient reminder to us that no human society may consider itself beyond the need 
to remain vigilant of the minimum core of human dignity. In all of these examples, 
one key commonality is the extreme vulnerability and dependence of the victims of 
abuse; those in such situations will gladly cash in whatever protection can be gained 
from the  ‘ minimum ’ , but hard, core of the status and basic principle of human dig-
nity. In sum, then, with regard to the most acute and urgent human rights problems 
 26  At one point in the ongoing struggles to ensure that US detainees were being treated humanely, George 
W. Bush noted,  ‘ This debate is occurring because of the Supreme Court’s ruling that said that we must 
conduct ourselves under Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions. And Common Article III says 
that there will be no outrages upon human dignity. It’s very vague. What does that mean,  “ outrages 
upon human dignity. ” That’s a statement that is wide open to interpretation ’ : Press Conference of the 
President, 15 Sept. 2006. 
 27  Consider, e.g., the entire series of cases involving violations of the right to life in Chechnya, the most 
recent of which is App. No. 20755/04,  Akhmadova v. Russia , ECHR Judgment of 25 Sept. 2008, not yet 
reported. 
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worldwide, a judicial (among other actors) reinforcement and consolidation of the 
content of the minimum core of human dignity is well worth pursuing, even if it is 
limited to the bare outlines of the three interrelated claims McCrudden identifi es. 
 In addition, perhaps one can go even a couple of steps further than McCrudden 
allows in describing the content of the minimum core. For instance, he lays out very 
synthetically and accurately the critical mediating function which the status and basic 
principle of human dignity played in the negotiation and adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Given the agreement on dignity as the most signifi cant 
pillar of the Universal Declaration’s edifi ce, should we not regard the rest of the Uni-
versal Declaration as itself specifying to another degree the content of the more gen-
eral recognition of the status and basic principle of human dignity? 28 Its 30 Articles 
by themselves still do not give us the specifi city necessary to make hard choices about 
how to balance, say, the right to education or freedom of association against other 
aspects of the common good (including the rights of others), so the greater detailing 
of the content of human dignity does not obviate the need for judicial interpretation 
which reaches beyond the minimum core of the concepts. 29 But it does suggest that 
the minimum core may be a little thicker than McCrudden acknowledges, and accord-
ingly more useful to judicial interpretation and protection of human rights. 
 Finally, we should not ignore the possibilities of bolstering our understanding of the 
minimum core of human dignity through serious philosophical refl ection on human 
reality. McCrudden’s emphasis on the existence or not of a consensus about its mean-
ing is understandable  – he rightly points out that such cross-cultural agreement has 
always been a part of the  ‘ holy grail ’ of human rights concepts. As a practical matter, 
we do and must seek consensus on fundamental principles in order to secure wide-
spread acceptance and effective realization of human rights. That does not mean, 
however, that consensus is itself the basis for the truth of any assertion of the require-
ments of human dignity. In other words, even where there is not an international 
consensus on some aspect of the minimum requirements of human dignity, there 
may be good reason to affi rm its validity; conversely, the existence of an international 
consensus regarding human dignity is not an infallible sign of its truth. If the  ‘ status ’ 
prong of the idea of dignity which McCrudden articulates  – the ontological claim that 
each human being has inherent worth as an individual person  – is true, then that 
dignity exists whether or not there is a consensus about its meaning and content. 
Where there is disagreement, then, it may well be the case that one of the positions is 
mistaken. Notwithstanding the mid-sixteenth century Spanish controversy over the 
rationality of the indigenous people of the New World, they nonetheless  did have equal 
human dignity and natural rights; the lack of consensus on the question can hardly be 
 28  See, e.g., the extended way in which this is achieved by John Finnis, in Finnis,  supra note 16, at Chap. 
VIII. 
 29  When read as an indivisible whole, however, the Universal Declaration may also help to establish some 
of the boundaries of such specifi cation and balancing, by ensuring that none of the principles are inter-
preted with complete disregard for the others. Maintaining such a  ‘ practical concordance ’ of the various 
principles is a technique used, for instance, by the German Constitutional Court: see D. Kommers,  The 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2nd edn., 1997), at 45 – 46. 
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said to have destroyed the objective fact of their human nature and the basic require-
ments of justice that their dignity demanded. Thus Bartolomé de Las Casas was cor-
rect in asserting it and demanding its respect; Juan Gines de Sepúlveda was wrong to 
deny it. 30 
 In some cases, then, the capacities of reason and wisdom, drawn from the dynamics 
of human experience, can lead us to certain conclusions about dignity independently 
of majoritarian conventionalism. Indeed, often the protection of dignity is most urgent 
precisely where a majoritarian conventionalism refuses to recognize the personhood 
and worth of some class or other of individual human beings, because the  inherent 
worth of the human person may be all that one has left, the only thing untouchable by 
power. None of this discussion is meant to brush aside the diffi culty of identifying the 
requirements of human dignity or the desirability of seeking widespread agreement on 
the matter. 31 I merely mean that a minimum  consensus cannot be the decisive deter-
minant of the minimum  content of the status and basic principle of human dignity, if 
dignity is in reality what we claim it to be. 
 Along with a silent core, McCrudden introduces us to the cacophony of the mar-
gins. His descriptive analysis makes the case, beyond any serious doubt, that on a vari-
ety of contentious issues the idea of human dignity as used in judicial interpretation 
across jurisdictions has no identifi ably coherent meaning. Focusing on beginning-of-
life and end-of-life questions, on the distribution of economic benefi ts, on the complex 
and historically-conditioned balancing of expression and equality in different socie-
ties, it would be truly astonishing not to fi nd a range of mutually incompatible asser-
tions that one or another outcome is most expressive of the requirements of dignity. 
It is not self-evident that the same conclusion would be warranted with respect to a 
broader array of issues less contentious and less profoundly disputed at an ethical and 
social level than the ones McCrudden draws upon. The incoherence seems far less 
apparent in cases involving the death penalty, for instance  – the example on which 
my initial  ius commune thesis was based. The degree to which incoherence is appar-
ent with respect to other questions of human rights that reach beyond the minimum 
core, but that are comfortably on the near side of the most contentious marginal 
cases which McCrudden examines, remains an open question unanswered by either 
McCrudden’s work or mine. 32 
 Moreover, it is not obvious that the existence of intense controversy at the edges of a 
community of legal discourse necessarily undermines an affi rmation of the value and 
coherence of the status and basic principle of human dignity in the overall system of 
 30  For a full description and study of the disputation between Las Casas and Sepúlveda see L. Hanke,  All 
Mankind is One (1974). 
 31  There are of course intense ongoing debates over the possibility and diffi culty of giving greater defi nite 
content to the concept of human dignity in the context of bioethics. For one excellent collection of essays 
attempting to do so, while recognizing the diffi culties of any such attempt, see  Human Dignity and Bioeth-
ics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics (2008), and especially the essays by Adam 
Schulman and F. Daniel Davis in that volume. 
 32  McCrudden himself seems to acknowledge this, and leaves the question to future research in the area: 
McCrudden,  supra note 2, at 710 – 712. 
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law. The value of legal norms often lies in what a legal system takes for granted, and 
thus what may stand beyond the immediate purview of political and judicial actors, 
and other participants in and observers of the system. The more effectively a robust 
core of ideas about human dignity is at work, the less we may notice their coherence, 
acceptance, and rightness. One should therefore be very careful about making general 
judgements about the whole of a legal system, or about the overall value of any specifi c 
principle within it, primarily by reference to what is occurring at an observable margin. 
 If we unite this relative narrowing of the scope and signifi cance of controversy at 
the far margins of the discussion on dignity with the more robust core discussed ear-
lier, then the fi eld of applicability of a substantive transnational dialogue about the 
requirements of the status and basic principle of human dignity may be substantially 
wider than McCrudden seems willing to recognize. 
 3 Traffi cking in Human Rights or Dialogue about Human 
Goods? 
 In spite of the differences in emphasis outlined in the immediately preceding section, 
and in light of the convergence of McCrudden’s analysis with a full understanding 
of the idea of the  ius commune presented in the fi rst part, overall there is much agree-
ment in our respective understandings of the role that the status and basic principle of 
human dignity play in judicial interpretations of human rights. In particular, we can 
agree on the existence of a sizable and important gap between the universal idea of 
human dignity in the abstract and its deployment in the concrete practice of judicial 
interpretation of human rights. That gap has important implications for judicial prac-
tice at the national and transnational levels. For McCrudden, it means turning away 
from a focus on the substantive meaning and content of the concept(s) of dignity, and 
instead fi nding the utility of the idea of human dignity in a process-oriented and insti-
tutional analysis of the way dignity is used in human rights adjudication. Although 
these functional approaches can and do generate helpful insights, McCrudden’s own 
work helps to show why a continued committed engagement in  substantive dialogue 
about the status and basic principle of human dignity is indeed indispensable to the 
future of the global human rights enterprise. 
 McCrudden identifi es three different functions which the status and basic principle 
of dignity perform in judicial interpretation: justifying particular resolutions of con-
fl icts of otherwise incommensurable values;  ‘ smoothing over ’ constitutional transi-
tions to international human rights standards by facilitating the adaptation of those 
universal norms to local context; and justifying the creation of new rights or the 
extension of existing rights to new circumstances. It is worth noticing that in each 
case the idea of human dignity is capable of performing the designated function  only 
because it appeals to, draws its authority from, and claims to be the bearer of some 
extra-legal and supra-positive value. It cannot otherwise coherently shift the weight 
of value toward one of the poles in a confl ict between incommensurable values. It can-
not otherwise be the mediator between local context and universal norms. It cannot 
 940     EJIL  19 (2008),  931 – 944 
otherwise justify new or expanded rights not already recognized and contained in the 
existing positive law. 
 Of course, it is quite possible in any of these cases that judges  claim to be appeal-
ing to some higher standard by reference to human dignity but in fact are not, and 
are instead deceiving their interlocutors or even themselves. McCrudden recognizes 
this possibility and often comes close to affi rming its reality  – he frequently qualifi es 
the description of judicial uses of the status and basic principle of dignity as merely 
 ‘ appearing ’ to incorporate a universal principle, for example. But he rightly acknowl-
edges that if it were the case that such appeals to human dignity in fact did not have 
any objective referents, but instead were merely rhetorical disguises for some other 
operative criteria of judicial decision-making, the legitimacy of using dignity would be 
reasonably rejected. Thus McCrudden ultimately backs away from making any fi rm 
pronouncement on the point of judicial insincerity, but the question is critical because 
the very possibility of the rule of law is undermined if the status and basic principle of 
dignity are only a  ‘ smokescreen behind which substantive judgments are being made, 
but unarticulated as such ’ . 33 This is especially true if we move beyond the use of the 
concepts of dignity within a single jurisdiction and consider their function in justifying 
transnational transfers of human rights norms across different courts and contexts. 
That circulation of human rights norms, by defi nition not (save in a few exceptional 
cases) authorized by any appeal to positive law, can be justifi ed only if there is some 
meaningfully intelligible commonality to the underlying value which gives the 
human rights norm at issue its claim to supra-positive authority. In the absence of 
that universality, the transnational circulation of human rights norms in adjudica-
tion is indistinguishable from the arbitrary or idiosyncratic preference of a judge for 
some norm over some other one. Judicial borrowing in that case risks being reduced to 
a brisk trade in whatever ideologies or fashions, prejudices and powers which happen 
to be dominant among the cultural and economic elites of the global scene  – what I 
have referred to elsewhere as  ‘ traffi cking in human rights ’ . 34 
 That is not to say that the only other alternative is to arrive at common results or 
a common meaning of human dignity in any thick sense of  ‘ convergence ’ or  ‘ har-
monization ’ . On the contrary, the transnational circulation of human rights norms 
admits of legitimate pluralism in the specifi cation of the underlying justifying value 
of human dignity. This is one of the main points of the argument that human rights 
norms should be understood as a new global form of  ius commune (to return full circle 
to the beginning of this commentary), rather than as a set of uniform norms. The 
idea of the  ius commune , like other doctrines and analyses which embody structural 
subsidiarity, seeks to steer a path between the semantic emptiness of human rights 
that results in a dictatorship of relativism, 35 on the one hand, and the imperialism 
 33  Yet again it bears repeating that this is the case of any foundational normative concept in law, not 
uniquely of human dignity. 
 34  Carozza,  ‘ Il traffico dei diritti umani nell’età postmoderna ’ , in L. Antonini (ed.),  Il traffico dei diritti 
insaziabili (2007). 
 35  See, e.g., the self-declared  ‘ human rights nihilism ’ of M.-B. Dembour, in  Who Believes in Human Rights? 
(2006). 
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of falsely monolithic universals, on the other. It certainly may contribute to a cross-
cultural convergence of understandings at some level, but only over a very long horizon: 
 ‘ achieving uniformity in law through the relatively benign processes of importation 
and transplantation of legal norms and concepts, if it is even possible, is likely to be 
more like the movement of tectonic plates than the movement of consumer goods  – it 
needs space and time in global and epochal proportions ’ . 36 
 In the more immediate frame, then, what is the end of the  ‘ common enterprise ’ of a 
transnational judicial dialogue which rests on a principled affi rmation of the univer-
sality of human dignity, and why is it worthy of our affi rmation and support? Why is 
a functional focus on process and institutions not enough? McCrudden’s historical 
reconstruction of the status and basic principle of dignity in the development of the 
human rights movement is a useful starting point here. He reminds us that, as used in 
the fi rst efforts to articulate common standards of human rights at the international 
level,  ‘ human dignity ’ represents the intersection of a variety of different traditions 
of thought, many of which in various degrees have mutually incompatible premises 
 – especially premises about the nature of the human person and the source of his or 
her rights. In order to circumvent the obstacle of this theoretical pluralism, those who 
set out to forge the fi rst global declaration of rights based their effort on a deliber-
ate abstention from debate, let alone agreement, about the theoretical foundations of 
human rights beyond the ambivalent  ‘ placeholder ’ , to use McCrudden’s designation, 
of the appeal to human dignity. 37 The focus of their agreement was on practical pre-
cepts alone. To this day, it remains a pervasive and persistent characteristic of inter-
national human rights that its fundamental principles are based on a very thin, if any, 
agreement about where they come from and what they mean. McCrudden’s critique 
of the conceptual coherence of the idea of dignity thus describes paradigmatically the 
structural problem which has characterized the contemporary human rights move-
ment from its origins. 
 To compensate for this precarious state, human rights lawyers and political actors 
have spent decades dedicating themselves to the building up of the positive law of 
international human rights  – multiple treaties, institutions, and processes designed to 
 ‘ translate ’ the underlying principles into hard norms with widespread global accept-
ance. Once  ‘ constitutionalized ’ in this way, the validity of the norms can become con-
ceptually distanced from their social or philosophical basis, like Hart’s Rule of Rec-
ognition or Kelsen’s  Grundnorm , thus obviating (or at least obscuring) the need (and 
perhaps even the possibility) to inquire into, or shore up, their originally pluralistic 
ethical starting points. That effort has had great value and tremendous success over 
the last 60 years, and overall represents a noble and valuable labour on behalf of jus-
tice and the good of the peoples of the world. Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic and 
disingenuous to ignore the limitations of building the edifi ce of global human rights 
law merely on a positive law which has only a very thin practical accord beneath it. 
 A fi rst diffi culty with that arrangement is that, generally speaking, one frequently 
fi nds a widespread gap between formal international norms and instruments of 
 36  Carozza,  supra note 7, at 77. 
 37  See the extensive reconstruction in M.A. Glendon , A World Made New (2001). 
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human rights law and the local social, political, and cultural contexts in which they 
are supposed to be operative in practice. 38 The law which is constructed without atten-
tiveness to the underlying cultural context tends toward abstraction which separates 
it from the society that it purports to regulate. (The principal alternative that one fi nds 
in, for example, colonial contexts is that the formal and abstract law is maintained 
through the use of considerable coercive force, which, with respect to human rights 
law, would indeed be an intolerable self-contradiction.) That this problem is not very 
evident in certain well-functioning constitutional democracies, like those of Western 
Europe, is not principally due to a higher degree of  ‘ positivization ’ of the principles, but 
rather to the fact that the underlying commitments and values necessary to sustain 
the positive law are in fact present, unlike in many other regions of the world. 
But that observation actually leads us to the second problem area. The thinness of 
the cultural basis of human rights law becomes even more of a diffi culty insofar as 
we recognize that law and rights do not by themselves  generate the conditions and 
commitments necessary to sustain the prepolitical values that make the law effective. 
Even Jürgen Habermas  – he of  ‘ constitutional patriotism ’ and the self-suffi ciency of 
the liberal legal state  – has come to acknowledge that: 
 Taken by themselves, moral insights and the worldwide consensus in moral indignation at 
massive breaches in human rights would suffi ce only for a wafer-thin integration of the citi-
zens of a politically structured world society (if that were ever to become a reality). An abstract 
solidarity, mediated by the law, arises among citizens only when the principles of justice have 
penetrated more deeply into the complex of ethical orientations in a given culture. 39 
 In short, the thin practical consensus on human rights alone is not self-sustaining; 
it depends on extra-legal sources of consensus about human status and worth and 
extra-legal sources of commitment to respecting that status and worth.
 Without the nourishment of a genuine connection between the abstract human 
rights norms and the cultures which can sustain them and which are subject to 
them, a third set of problems arises. The mediation between the law and the social 
basis from which it arises and towards which it is directed would, in the focal case of 
a law-governed community, normally occur through the political life of the commu-
nity, by the practical  ‘ art ’ of reasoning together and persuading one another about 
the goods of the community and how to realize them. 40 Instead, the vacuum existing 
between the positive law of international human rights and the meaning-generative 
contexts in which people actually live their lives tends to get fi lled with an exaggerated 
role of bureaucratic institutions and political elites. As Philip Allott memorably put 
it, human rights in the international legal order have been  ‘ swept up into the maw 
 38  This is most evident in the high degree of non-compliance with international norms in the human rights 
sphere. See, e.g., Chapter III of any of the recent annual reports of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, which detail degrees of state implementation of that Commission’s recommendations by 
the Member States, available at:  http://cidh.org/annual.eng.htm . 
 39  Habermas,  ‘ Pre-Political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional State? ’ , in J. Habermas and 
J. Ratzinger,  Dialectics of Secularization (2006), at 19, 34. 
 40  Cf. Alexis de Tocqueville’s repeated references to the  ‘ art of association ’ and the  ‘ art of pursuing in com-
mon ’ the goals of democratic society: A. Tocqueville,  Democracy in America (trans. Henry Reeve, 1904). 
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 41  P. Allott,  Eunomia: New Order for a New World (1990), at 288. 
 42  One of the most acute commentators on this depoliticization of social life and its relationship to different 
understandings and uses of rights is Pierre Manent: see, e.g., P. Manent,  A World beyond Politics? (trans. 
M. Lepain, 2006). 
 43  See, e.g.,  Tysiac v. Poland , 45 EHRR (2007) 42 (ECtHR) (failure to provide access to a therapeutic abortion 
constitutes a violation of Art. 8 ECHR). 
 44  See, e.g.,  I. v. United Kingdom , 36 EHRR (2003) 53 (ECtHR) (Grand Chamber) (restriction on ability of 
post-operative transsexual to marry constitutes a violation of Art. 12 ECHR). 
 45  See, e.g.,  Hatton v. United Kingdom , 37 EHRR (2003) 28 (ECtHR) (Grand Chamber) (fi nding that noise 
from Heathrow airport did not violate the rights of the petitioners). 
 46  For instance, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is currently considering a number of 
cases alleging that laws restricting the use of  in vitro fertilization techniques violate human rights. 
of an international bureaucracy. The reality of human rights has been degraded  … 
[T]hey were turned into bureaucratic small-change [and] became a plaything of gov-
ernments and lawyers. ’ 41 Accompanying this reality is an emphasis on procedures; 
the masking of substantive discord with endless process. In short, the risk is of a reduction 
of political life and its substitution by a weak legalism and formalism. It should be no 
wonder that many international adjudicative bodies in the human rights sector are 
notorious for their poor legal reasoning, the loose conceptualization in their jurispru-
dence, and their frequent underappreciation of the need for political life to sustain the 
realization of human rights. 42 
 Finally, the thinness of the foundations of human rights and the resultant bureau-
cratic proceduralism only obscure the deeper differences among cultures which in 
fact persist. The arrangement merely defers disagreement on fundamental questions. 
Under the veneer of authoritative process, there continues to be controversy over the 
interpretation and application of even the most basic of rights, like life, 43 and over the 
relationship between fundamental rights and the most elemental forms of social life, 
like the family. 44 The divergent understandings are even more pronounced as one gets 
further away from the protection of the minimum core of human dignity (as discussed 
earlier) like life and physical integrity, and more into the diffi cult weighing of compet-
ing goods characteristic of constitutional claims generally. 45 This will be only truer as 
we continue to see deeply contested moral questions all becoming processed as juridi-
fi ed human rights claims, and as the challenges of new technologies and new threats 
to human existence continue to make themselves felt. 46 
 My goal is not to overstate the vices of contemporary human rights here  – as I already 
acknowledged, the positive achievements have also been great  – but instead to lay the 
foundations for understanding why a  substantive , not merely procedural, bureaucratic-
institutional, or formal and legalistic, dialogue on the meaning of human dignity 
is so vital to the future of the human rights experiment. I do not mean  ‘ dialogue ’ in 
a weak sense, a mere interchange of discourse and deliberation without genuine dif-
ference or desire to get at the truth of things, but a  dia-logos , a sharing of reason with 
one another. The  ‘ common enterprise ’ , in other words, is an occasion for exchanging 
reasoned and substantive judgements across cultural and geographic divides about 
the meaning of human fl ourishing, what it requires of us in justice, and how it can be 
variously understood and protected in communities constituted by their commitment 
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 47  On the necessity for law to give good reasons for practical decision see Finnis,  ‘ On Hart’s Ways: Law as 
Reason and as Fact ’ [2007]  American J Jurisprudence (2007) 52. 
 48  See the epigraph to this essay. 
to a common good. What reasons can I give you to care about and commit yourself to 
human rights? Why should we recognize the authenticity of  these demands of dignity 
as opposed to others? What is the basis for regarding a particular thing as both good 
for me and good for others like me, both within the communities to which I belong 
and across their boundaries? 47 Transnational dialogue of this kind is a provocation to 
refl ect more deeply, collectively, and comparatively on the breadth of human experi-
ence and the fulfi lment of elemental human needs and desires. 
 Of course, there is no reason why judges should have a privileged position in con-
ducting such a dialogue, and sometimes there are good reasons why their participation 
in it ought to be restrained by the contingent constitutional concerns of one jurisdic-
tion or another. Still, in the majority of legal systems of the contemporary world, judges 
necessarily play a prominent role in the protection of human rights, and thus help to 
constitute our understandings of them through their words and actions, and so the 
dialogue on dignity has an evident place within the judicial sphere. In the end, how-
ever, reasoned refl ection on human fl ourishing needs to take place at the level of indi-
vidual persons in community with others. There, dialogue can lead to greater critical 
self-refl ection, and a greater capacity to recognize and commit oneself in solidarity to 
the good of others. Only in that way will human rights be about loving people in their 
concrete experience  – hard work, rest, and a sad song in the garden  – rather than the 
abstraction of loving Humanity. 48 
